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Summary
International tax competition has been studied quite thoroughly through-
out the past decade. However, the efficiency of governments involved in
creating public goods has received little attention in the analysis of tax
competition. This paper contributes to filling this gap. Namely, we claim
that international investors consider the tax rates of a country, as well as its
efficiency in providing public goods when making an investment decision.
As a result, it becomes possible that a country with a higher tax rate can
still attract some investment.
We outline a model where two countries are competing for foreign
investments by strategically setting their income tax rates. One of the
countries is relatively more efficient than the other. Formally, this means
that the government of this country is able to producemore public goods
out of the same revenue than the government of the other country. The
existence of public goods reduces the production costs of the firms – public
goods considered here are such as infrastructure or public education. As a
result, it might be worthwhile to invest in countries with higher tax rates
but with a higher level of public goods provision. Themain conclusion is
that, in equilibrium, the more efficient government always sets a higher
tax-rate than the government of the less efficient country.
The model is tested empirically on a sample of 28 countries, for the
years 1996 to 2005. Withminor deviations, the predictions of the theoretical
model are supported by the empirical analysis. In a "race to the bottom"
framework, this implies that highly efficient countries that traditionally
impose higher taxes should not be afraid of tax competition, since they can
still attract investments by creating a high-quality business infrastructure.
At the same time, less efficient countries should not "converge" to those of
higher efficiency in taxation policy, since this will drive out all the foreign
capital.
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1 Introduction∗
This paper examines the effect of a government’s efficiency on the taxation
policy of a state. Namely, we claim that countries are different in the way
they tax capital as well as in the way they spend the collected revenue. Ob-
viously, there are governments that spend the tax revenue more efficiently
than other governments. Therefore, they can producemore public goods
out of the same amount of money. We assume that firms, when choosing
the location of investment, consider not only the tax rate set in the country,
but also its provision of public goods. As a result, capital tax rates are differ-
ent in equilibrium: the more efficient country attracts investments even
with higher taxes, while the less efficient one is forced to use lower fiscal
pressure as its only instrument of inducing firms to stay.
Due to its relevance for policymakers, the topic of international tax
competition has been studied quite thoroughly through the past decades.
The theoretical framework used here is a modification of the "work-horse"
Zodrow-Mieszkowski (ZMW) model, conceptualized by Oates (13) and for-
malized by Zodrow andMieszkowski (22). Some scholars adopt also a game
theoretical approach.1 The role of the government in these models varies
from purely beneficent, like in Zodrow-Mieszkowski (22) and Devereux
et al. (8), to completely mercenary, like in Leviathan-type framework of
Wooders et al. (20).2 At the same time, despite their diversity, none of these
models account for the efficiency of governments involved in tax compe-
tition. Indeed, all of them assume that each state can produce the same
amount of public good out of one unit of private good. At the same time, it
is clear that the way bureaucrats spend the tax revenue in a country defines
the quantity and quality of the public good produced. Therefore, not only
the amount of revenue collected is important but also how efficiently it
is spent. On the other hand, the investment decision of a multinational
corporation may be based not only on the domestic tax rate, but also on
the public infrastructure provided by the country. Indeed, for a company
such infrastructure may reduce the cost of the good’s production and its
∗I am grateful for deep and insightful suggestions to my supervisor at CEU Péter Benczúr,
and tomy supervisors at BavarianGraduate Program in Economics A.Haufler andW. Buchholz.
I would also like to thank to participants of the seminars in Regensburg and Passau, especially
to L. Arnold, R. Riphahn and G. Lee. Finally, the current version of the paper is the outcome
of my cooperation with the Ministry of Finance of Hungary. I am grateful to Péter Bakos,
Dóra Benedek, Anikó Bíró and Ágota Scharle for their comments, and help in the publication.
Comments and suggestions to: maksym.ivanyna@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de
1See, for instance, Devereux et al. (8), Wooders et al. (20)
2We provide more detailed explanation of these in Section 2.2.
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delivery to the market.
Our paper is an attempt to fill the above-mentioned gap, present in the
existing literature. Namely, we propose amodel of two countries engaged in
competition for foreign investments. There is a continuumofmultinational
companies willing to invest in either of the two possible locations. They are
assumed to be technologically "dependent" on the amount of public good
produced in the country. Therefore, they make their investment choices
comparing not only the tax rates in the competing countries, but also the
reduction of their production costs due to the business infrastructure. At
the same time, the government of one country is relatively more efficient
than the government of the other, which allows it to produce relatively
more public good out of the same tax revenue, and therefore attract more
firms. We find that in equilibrium the more efficient country always sets
a higher tax-rate than the less efficient one. Our results, though, do not
contradict the "overall" conclusion of the contemporary literature that the
reaction functions of both governments are increasing near the equilibrium.
Here the reaction function is the tax rate of a country as a function of the
"rest-of-the-world" tax rate. One more conclusion of the model is that
the reaction function of a country becomes steeper with an increase in
governmental efficiency.
Finally, we test the model empirically, using data of 28 countries, for the
years 1996 to 2005. As a proxy for tax burdenwe use the effective average tax
rate (EATR). EATR basically defines the share of the firm’s future cash flow,
which it will have to transfer to the country’s government. Governmental
efficiency is proxied by the Index of Economic Freedom (published annually
by theHeritage Foundation), and by gross domestic product per capita. The
methodology we use is standard for testing strategic interaction between
several players. We find that, indeed, the "rest-of-the-world" tax rate and
governmental efficiency affect significantly and positively the tax rate of a
given country, as well as the slope of the reaction function. Therefore, the
main conclusions of the model are confirmed by the empirics.
The structure of the paper is the following: we present some stylized
facts from European history as well as a literature overview concerning the
theory and the testing of tax competition in Section 2. In Section 3 we set
up and solve the model. Next, Section 4 is devoted to the empirical testing
of the results obtained in Section 3. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
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2 Background
This section concerns the motives leading us to writing this paper. Namely,
we discuss here the history of European tax competition and its connection
with the efficiency of a country’s government. Further, we proceed with the
theory of tax competition as it is presented in the current literature, and
highlight its possible gaps.
2.1 Historical Evidence from Europe
Europe represents a perfect training range for those who study tax compe-
tition. Indeed, especially after the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the obstacles
for capital movements in EU-15 are practically absent. Although there are
a few discrepancies between the EU-15 and the newmembers in corporate
legislation,3 the capital is highly mobile in these countries as well. Per-
fect capital mobility is one of the main assumptions of tax competition
modelling, therefore EU-25 becomes a flawless region for theory testing.
We are not going to get into details about the tax rate movements in
Europe throughout the history. Those interested may refer to the extensive
surveys of Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (7), Devereux and Sorensen(9) (for
EU-15), and Devereux (5) (for the newmembers). On the contrary, to make
our analysis more tractable, we divide Europe into three groups, consisting
of countries that are homogeneous in certain properties. First is the EU-
Core, to which we ascribe France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.
These are the long-held stable democracies, traditionally providing high
level of public good. EU-periphery, the second group, consists of Spain,
Greece and Portugal. These countries entered the EU relatively recently
and are still trying to catch up with the EU-core standards. Finally, the
last group is CEE countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic
and Slovenia: new EU members, lagging quite substantially behind the
EU-Core. Figure 1 shows, how the effective average corporate tax rates were
changing in these groups from 1996 to 2005.4
One can easily see fromfigure 1 that the average EATRwas always higher
in the EU-Core than in any other group, while EATRs of EU-periphery and
CEEC were practically the same until recently. However, EATR’s of CEEC
3First of all, the new member countries are still allowed to subsidize and create special
allowances for certain industries and certain geographical areas.
4EATR’s for EU-15 were calculated by Devereux and Griffith, who used them in (6). For CEE
countries EATR’s were calculated by Bellak et al. (2) and Jacobs et al. (11). We return to this
measure in Section 4.2.
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Figure 1: Effective average corporate tax rates
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Source: Devereux, Griffith (6), Bellak et al. (2), Jacobs et al. (11), Kotans (12)
decreased significantly (almost by 6 percentage points) in the last two years.
Note that 2004 is the year, when these countries became EUmembers.
Figure 2 depicts the development of the governmental efficiency in
these groups. As a proxy here we use the Index of Economic Freedom, is-
sued yearly by the Heritage Foundation (10).5 It varies from 1 for a perfectly
free country to 5 for a deeply repressed one. As we can see from the graph,
the EU-Core countries always attained the highest degree of economic free-
dom, while CEEC lagged behind the other two groups. The indices seem to
converge with the time. However, until 2005, the pattern stays the same:
EU-core has the lowest index, then comes EU-periphery, followed by CEEC.
The picture shown in this section clearly testifies the positive correlation
between the tax rate set by the country and the efficiency of its government.
Indeed, EU-core countries charge high taxes, but at the same time they are
the most efficient, while CEE countries charge low taxes in exchange for
the lowest level of efficiency.
5Refer to Section 4.2 for more details.
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Figure 2: Index of economic freedom, Heritage Formation (higher numbers
mean less economic freedom)
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2.2 Literature Review
The contemporary economic literature on the issue of international capital
tax competition is more than crowded by different theories and directions.6
The first one, who has driven the attention to this topic was Tiebout (17). He
claims that the competition between jurisdictions leads to more efficient
provision of public goods, accounting for the heterogeneous preferences of
their inhabitants. However, Oates (13), Zodrow andMieszkowski (22) and
Wilson (18) (ZMW) assert that the interjurisdictional competition for the
capital results in welfare-reducing tax undercutting, which they call "race-
to-the-bottom". This framework was adopted by OECD and EU officials
when arguing about the ban of tax competition.7 At the same time, there
were few responses to the ZMW-type models. In some of them, such as
Brennan and Buchanan (3), competition among jurisdictions is considered
as the way to "tame" ever-growing Leviathan state. In addition, Wooders et
6See Wilson (19), Brueckner (4), Stewart andWebb (16) for detailed surveys.
7See OECD (14) for more details.
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al.(21) use the ZMW-framework to show that the tax competition may even
lead to "race-to-the-top" if the public good affects positively the production
function of the firm.
The models described above use different computation techniques, as
well as adopt various assumptions about the firms and the governments.
However, we did not find any theoretical paper dealing with the efficiency
of the government. Indeed, all the models assume that the government
produces one unit of public good out of one unit of private good, collected
as a tax revenue, i.e. the production function is g = x. What we do in our
model is that we assign different production functions to the governments
of two competing countries, and then study the effect of this modification
on the equilibrium outcome.
There are a few papers, which resemble to a certain degree our consid-
erations. Tiebout (17), Qian and Weingast (15) deal with the increase of
governmental efficiency whenever the countries are engaged in interna-
tional competition. However, these articles are rather narratives about the
functioning of institutions. In our paper we use formalmodelling approach,
and in the end empirically test the model.
Leviathan-state models, mentioned above, may be claimed to account-
ing for governmental efficiency. But our setup is much wider than studying
the behavior of the selfregarding government. While we can include such
factors as corruption level, or unwillingness to work in the production
function, efficiency of the government also depends on the experience,
traditions, technologies, etc., regardless of bureaucrats’ malevolence or
benevolence. The same argument works when comparing our model to
the agglomeration economy literature.8
The framework of the model was borrowed fromWooders and Zissimos
(20). They also use two competing countries and continuum of technologi-
cally different firms. However, in their model governments are assumed to
be identical, which gives completely different results in the outcome.
3 TheModel
Here we shortly present a theoretical grounding for the fact that the tax
rates in countries should not necessarily converge to a common value.
Namely, we build a model in which two countries are in competition for
foreign investments. One of the countries is relatively more efficient than
8See Baldwin and Krugman (1), for instance.
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the other, meaning that the government of the former country is able to
produce relativelymore public good out of the same revenue. The countries
play a classical game, in which they choose optimal taxation policy. The
result is that in Nash equilibrium the more efficient country always charges
higher tax than the "inefficient" one. Moreover, the reaction functions of
both countries are upward sloping and become steeper with the increase
of difference between them.
Section 3.1 sets up the model: we describe the behavior of the firms
and governments, and give the rules of the game. In section 3.2 we describe
the reaction functions of the governments and find corresponding Nash
equilibria. Section 3.3 concludes.
3.1 Setup of theModel
The model consists of two countries, A and B , and multinational firms,
willing to invest in these countries. Governments of both countries levy
tax on every firm entering the market, and produce public goods out of
the collected revenue. Firms make their investment choices taking into
account the tax rates observed. First, we concentrate on the behavior of the
firms, then go back to the governments, and finally set up the rules of the
tax setting game.
3.1.1 Firms
We assume that there are infinitely many firms in the model. Each of
them, in the absence of taxation and public good provision, incurs cost
c of producing one unit of some good. Later it delivers this good to the
market and sells for a price p.9 Public goods, provided by the government,
are assumed to affect positively the production technology of each firm.
Indeed, public good provision in a country includes such productivity
enhancing activities as road construction, investments in education (hence
fostering qualified labor), work of the contract-enforcing institutions, such
as courts, police, labor unions, antitrust bodies, and production of the
business-related laws. Therefore, when investing in one of the countries,
each firm has to pay a tax, imposed by the government, and at the same
time it can use the business infrastructure of the country to reduce the cost
of the good’s production and it’s delivery to the market.
9Therefore, p − c is assumed to be constant for every firm. Even if we allow for different
costs and profits it will not change the results of the model, since neither p nor c influence the
firm’s choice about the investment place.
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Each firm is characterized by the parameter s of its technological attach-
ment to the level of public good provision in the country: the higher is s the
more advantages can the firm extract from present business infrastructure.
For simplicity, s is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. One can
interpret this parameter as the degree to which the firm is tied to the public
goods in the country, or as a share of resources, which it needs to produce
and deliver the good to the market, and which are provided by the state for
free. Naturally, different firms in different industries have different needs
for such resources. For example, an original software developer will be
willing to open its subsidiary in the country with highly educated labor,
developed Internet network, etc. Probably, the most important thing for
this firm will be the effective system of intellectual property rights protec-
tion. At the same time, retailers of cracked software need none of above
mentioned services, except maybe Internet network availability.10
The firm with parameter s, fs , invests in country i , i ∈ {A,B}, in which
it makes more profits. The profit function looks the following way:
Πi = p− c−τi + s · ln( gi
sˆi
), (1)
where p is the price of the good, c is the cost of producing it when there is
no public good provision, and −τi + s · ln( gisˆi ) is the "technology" function,
showing the eventual cost for firm fs with "technological attachment"
parameter s, defined above, of producing one unit of good after paying
tax τi and using the level of the public good provision
gi
sˆi
. gi is country i ’s
overall amount of public good produced, and sˆi is the share of all firms
investing in that country. This way we assume that the public input is a
rival good for the firm, and the more firms invest in the country the harder
will it be for fs to use business infrastructure provided by the government.
For example, regardless of how good the public education is in the country,
the competition for talented graduates on the labour market gets tougher
with the increasing number of investors. The same applies to the usage
of roads and transport networks. However, this assumption certainly has
some implausible features. Clearly, some public goods proposed by the
government, such as business legislation, are non-rival, while others are
partly non-rival. For instance, if the market is not too saturated, one road
can be used by many firms, and no firm is completely excluded. However,
our assumption about public input rivalry helps to simplify the model
10In this example public good provision, such as protection of intellectual property rights,
may even harm the firm.
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significantly, while bringing no significant changes in results compared to
the case when public good is defined in a usual way.11
The "technology" function fits quite well the real life. Indeed, the firm
firstly pays a tax (−τi in the model) and then estimates additional to c the
extra profit that follows from the existence of public goods. This extra profit
(+ln( gisˆi ) in the model) has decreasing returns to scale property, which is a
plausible assumption.
Firm fs faces the tax rates in counties A and B - τA and τB respectively,
and the levels of public good provision - gA and gB . If −τA + s · ln( gAsˆA ) >
−τB +s · ln( gBsˆB ) then fs goes to country A, if−τA+s · ln(
gA
sˆA
)<−τB +s · ln( gBsˆB )
then it goes to country B . Otherwise, fs is indifferent.
3.1.2 Governments
Governments are assumed to be benevolent. Their objective is to gather
as much revenue as possible and transform it to the public good. From
the first point of view such a setup may seem strange: no governments
devote all their revenue on production of business enhancing public goods.
Apparently, more reasonable would be to assume that the governments
split the revenue into two parts: one of them goes to the production of
economy-enhancing public goods, another one goes to different social
payments and other expenditures. The government would then make
decisions depending on someweighted sumof those two parts. However, as
it can be seen later, such assumption makes the model much less tractable.
At the same time, the model presented in the paper has quite substantial
explanatory power. Indeed, transforming the whole revenue into "useful"
public goods undoubtedly brings some positive externality on all spheres
of life in the country. For example, investments in higher education or
road construction give benefits to both firms and individuals living in the
country. Therefore our assumption does not sound completely irrational.
The transformation from private good into public good is not one-to-
one as it is assumed in most of the similar models.12 The government of
country A is assumed to be more efficient in producing the public good
then the government of country B , i.e. it is able to produce more units of
11I.e. when the public good is non-rival. Such assumption makes the model intractable
even when the simplest "technology" function is used. Please contact the author if interested
in this case.
12Thesemodels assume that the amount of the public good produced is equal to the amount
of private good collected by imposing tax. See Wilson (19), Brueckner (4), Stewart andWebb
(16) for detailed surveys of theory and empirical evidence of tax competition.
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public good out of the same amount of private good than government B .13
In our model we assume that the governmental production functions have
the following form:
gA = sˆAa+bx, gB = sˆB +x, a > 1, b ≥ 1, a > b, (2)
where x is the amount of the private good collected, gA and gB are the
amounts of the public good produced out of the private good by the govern-
ments A and B , and sˆA and sˆB are the shares of firms investing in countries
A and B . The relative efficiency of government A is expressed by the fact
that both a and b are greater than 1. Note that the amount of private good
collected in country i is equal to the tax rate τi imposed by the government
multiplied by the share sˆi of the firms investing in that country. As a result,
the governmental production functions can be rewritten in the following
way:
gA = sˆA(a+bτA), gB = sˆB (1+τB ), a > 1, b ≥ 1, a > b, (3)
What the difference in the public good production functions means
in real life is that one country simply handles the revenue from taxes in a
better way than the other country does. It involves different aspects. Appar-
ently, one of the main features of the efficient government is a low level of
corruption, i.e. howmuchmoney is really spent on a production of public
good, and not put in the pockets of government officials through preferring
their own businesses or receiving bribes for inefficient solutions. Undoubt-
edly, efficiency as well as corruption is deeply correlated with the state of
political and civil rights in the society, freedom ofmass-media, and stability
of economic and political situation in the country. Not less important is the
expenditure side of the government. Obviously, the lump-sum payments
to the population would be less useful for economic development than the
investments in higher education, roads and digital networks building, or in
the fight against corruption. We will come back to this issue in section 4.
3.1.3 Game
As it was said in the previous subsection, the objective of a government
is to collect as much revenue as possible. At the same time, firms are
looking for a jurisdiction, where they can earn more after-tax profits. After
observing the tax rates τA and τB in countries A and B , and the levels
of public good provision gA and gB as well, sˆB share of the firms will go
13We call the government of country I just government I , I ∈ {A,B}
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to country B , the others sˆA = 1− sˆB will go to A.14 Obviously, both sˆA
and sˆB are between 0 and 1, and both depend on the strategic interaction
between the governments: given a and b, sˆA and sˆB depend on τA and τB :
sˆA = sˆA(τA ,τB ), sˆB = sˆB (τA ,τB ).
Facing completely mobile firms, which look for bigger profits, govern-
ments are engaged in a tax competition game. The sequence of the game is
the following:
1. Governments choose the tax rates τA and τB ;
2. Firms compare their profits in country A and country B , sˆB and
consequently sˆA are defined;
3. The revenues of the governments are τA(1− sˆB ) and τB sˆB , i.e. tax
rates imposed by the governments multiplied by the respective tax
bases.
sˆB is defined here as a share of firms investing in country B , and it
is basically a technology attachment parameter sˆ of a firm f sˆ , which is
indifferent between investing into country A and investing into country B .
Indeed, firms which are more technologically attached than f sˆ (such fs ’s
that s > sˆ) will invest in a country with more efficient government.15 This
is country A in our case. On the contrary, those less attached will invest in
country B . Therefore, it is the case that sˆB = sˆ and sˆA = 1− sˆ, where sˆ is the
technological attachment of the indifferent firm.
Considering the statement of the previous paragraph, we can calculate
the tax base for both governments (i.e. the shares of firms investing in either
of the countries) by simply finding the technological attachment index of
an indifferent firm. For such a firm f sˆ the following equality is true:
−τA + sˆ · ln( sˆ(a+bτA)
sˆ
)=−τB + sˆ · ln( sˆ(1+τB )
sˆ
) (4)
As a result, sˆ, which is equal to the tax base of the government B (and 1− sˆ
14In some cases there will be a firm, which will be indifferent between two countries, but
since we have continuum of firms, finite amount of them brings no revenue to the govern-
ments. Therefore the signs ">" and "≥" are identical in the model.
15One should consider different cases. However, it is true in equilibrium, so for the sake of
simplicity we leave detailed analysis out of this paper. For detailed analysis please refer to the
theoretical appendix (Proposition 1).
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is the tax base of the government A), will be the following:16
sˆ = τA −τB
ln(a+bτA)− ln(1+τB )
(5)
Further, we proceed with sketching the analytical solution to the model.
3.2 Reaction Functions
In this section we solve the model. First, reaction functions of the govern-
ments are described. After that the Nash equilibrium is found, depending
on the parameters a and b.
3.2.1 Optimal Responses of the Governments
The usual way to findNash equilibria in a game is to look at the intersection
of the reaction functions of the players. To find the reaction function of one
player we have to fix the strategy of the other player and come out with the
optimal response to it. We start with government A in our model.
Assume government B sets the tax rate on a level τB . The optimal
response of government A would then be a tax rate τA , which maximizes
the function:
τA · (1− sˆ(τA ,τB )) → max
0≤τA≤∞
, (6)
where sˆ is given by equation (5).
It is not optimal for government A to charge a tax lower than τB , since
even by setting the same tax, country A attracts all firms. At the same time,
if τB is low enough, government A will charge higher tax than τB in the
optimum. The intuition of this action is the following. Naturally, after
the increase the least "attached" firms will move to country B , since they
care mostly about the tax they pay, and not about the public good they
receive in exchange. Therefore, 1− sˆ will decrease. However, if the tax is
increased not too much, some firms will stay in A. Those firms will pay
more to the government, hence the revenue may increase. If τB is too high,
then the revenue gains fail to overweight the shrinkage of a tax base, and
government A charges τB .17 Besides the fact that the optimal response of
16Again, sˆ in general may be different, but for our purposes it is enough to use one specific
case. For more detailed analysis please refer to the theoretical appendix (Proposition 1).
17This feature of the reaction function is the outcome of the specific "technology" function
chosen. However, it does not influence the results in equilibrium. Refer to the appendix for
the detailed proof (Proposition 2).
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Figure 3: Optimal response of government A (left) and B (right)
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
τB
τ A
a=2.8
a=3.2
a=3.6
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
τA
τ B
a=3.6
a=3.2
a=2.8
government A, rA(τB ), is always at least as high as τB , it is also the case
that rA(τB ) is increasing in τB around the equilibrium.18 The left part of
figure 3 shows the graph of rA , as a function of τB , calibrated with different
parameter values.
Now let us turn to government B . Facing the tax rate τA , its optimal
response would be the value τB , which maximizes the following function:
τB · sˆ(τA ,τB ) → max
0≤τB≤∞
, (7)
where sˆ is given by equation (5).
First of all, it is worth to note that government B will never set higher
tax rate than τA if it follows optimal strategy. Indeed, it is obvious that no
firm will go to B if τA ≤ τB , since otherwise for any nonzero s fs would pay
higher tax and receive less public good.19
As a result, having no incentive to set high tax rate, government B
definitely would want to deviate from the "τA-strategy", i.e. setting always
τA . Applying similar techniques as we did for government A’s optimal
response to the maximization problem, we can show that government B ’s
response function, rB (τA) is always lower than τA , and is increasing in τA .
This means that government B looks for a "compromise" between the tax
rate it imposes and the share of firms it wants to attract to the country. The
right part of figure 4 shows the graph of government B ’s optimal response,
calibrated with different parameter values.
18The proof of this fact is omitted from the paper. Contact author for details.
19For details, see the appendix(Proposition 4).
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3.2.2 Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium of the game will be the intersection of our reaction
functions, rA(τB ) and rB (τA). Obviously, the Nash equilibrium will depend
only on a and b. To find it analytically we have to solve the equation:
τA = rA(rB (τA)) . (8)
We can easily show that under our assumptions about the parameters the
solution always exists, and is unique. Indeed, as we found in the previous
sections, the reaction function of government A is always increasing in τB .
Moreover, when τB is smaller than a certain τ∗B value determined by a and
b, the optimal τA is always above the 45-degree line (for τB ≥ τ∗B τA is equal
to τB ). At the same time, government B , following its optimal taxation
strategy, never sets its tax rate higher than or equal to τA . Therefore, its
whole reaction function lies above the 45-degree line. Since τB is increasing
in τA , both response functions intercept once in the area above the 45-
degree line (when τA ’s are depicted on the y-axis, and τB ’s on the x-axis).
τNEB < τ∗B , and therefore τNEA > τNEB . Figure 4 shows the Nash equilibria of
the game, calibrated with different parameter values. It is left to add that
both τNEA and τ
NE
B are increasing with a, as well as the reaction function
of the more efficient country becomes relatively steeper, as it can be seen
from the figure and can be shown formally.
Figure 4: Nash equilibria for two parameter values
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3.3 Conclusions
The main result of this section is that in equilibrium the more efficient
country charges higher tax rate than the one with less productive govern-
ment. It happens because on the one hand, government A extracts rents
from its efficiency by giving up some part of the least demanding firms,
but collecting higher revenue from those who stay. On the other hand,
government B is forced to set lower tax rate, since it is the only way it can
compete with the more developed country for foreign investments.
The reaction functions of both governments are monotonically increas-
ing, which together with the main result, is a testable prediction of the
model. Indeed, it is optimal for both countries to increase the tax rate in
response to the same action of the neighboring government. The key idea
here is that policymakers weight the potential profits of having themaximal
share of firms in the country and actual profits of having smaller share, but
with higher tax. The model predicts that under certain conditions20, the
governments prefer the latter.
One more insight of the model, which can also be tested, is that with
the increase of the difference in efficiency between countries, the reaction
function of the relatively more efficient country becomes steeper. At the
same time the reaction function of the less efficient gets flatter.21 This
means that beingmore efficient, country A adoptsmore aggressive taxation
policy, while country B has to defend its investments even more.
4 Testing the Theory
We now turn to the empirical testing of the model. In doing so we follow
Devereux et al. (8) and Brueckner (4) in their methodology. Specifically,
we run instrumental variable (IV) estimation on a panel of 28 countries,
years from 1996 to 2005. Accounting for a few control variables, we find
the coefficients of the "rest-of-the-world" average tax rate and of the proxy
for governmental efficiency to be highly significant and positive, as it was
predicted by the theory. Moreover, having added the interaction term to
the econometric model we are able to estimate the effect of governmental
efficiency on the slope of the reaction function. We find it positive, as it was
predicted by the theory.
20Such as τB is not too high.
21The formal proof of this fact is out of the scope of this paper. However, this is easily seen
on the calibrated variants of the model, figure 3.
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The structure of the chapter is the following. Section 4.1 describes the
empirical model and some econometric issues concerning its estimation.
Definition of variables, used in the regression, are given in section 4.2, the
results are presented in section 4.3. In the last part, 4.3.1, we present the
specification of the model with the interaction term.
4.1 Econometric Model
Extending our theoretical model to n countries we obtain a system of
equations:
τi ,t =Ri (τ−i ,t ,Xi ,t ), i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk (9)
where τi ,t denotes the tax rate in country i in year t , τ−i ,t denotes the
tax rates in the same year in the rest of the countries in the sample, Xi ,t
is a vector of other variables influencing the tax rate in the country, and
Ri (., .) denotes the country-specific reaction function. In principle, go-
vernments can react differently to the tax rate of each country. However,
the estimation of separate coefficients is hardly possible due to a large
number of countries and short time series of the sample. To overcome
the above-mentioned difficulty, we take the standard approach for testing
the presence of strategic interactions between jurisdictions.22 Instead of
including separate countries in the equation, we assume that the average
"world tax rate" influences the tax rate in country i . The following model is
estimated:
τi ,t =α+β
∑
j 6=i
ωi jτ j ,t+θ1Xi ,t ,1+θXi ,t ,−1+²i ,t , i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk . (10)
Similar to above, here t is the time index, ranging from some initial year
t1 to tk , and n is the number of countries (jurisdictions) in the sample.
Then τi ,t is the tax rate in country i at time t . Xi ,t is the set of control
variables for country i at time t . Note that we divided the vector X into
two parts: X1 and the rest, X−1. This is because we want to stress the
importance of one of the control variables - government efficiency. Finally,
ωi j , i = 1, . . . ,n, j = 1, . . . ,n are country-to-country specific weights, used
to calculate the average "rest-of-the-world" tax for a country i . They are
assumed to be exogenously given. Note that the ωi j ’s do not change with
time. α, β, θ are to be estimated by the regression. We are particularly
interested in β and θ1. Our model predicts them to be positive.
22See Brueckner (4), Devereux et al. (8), for example.
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The choice of ωi j ’s in our model is not straightforward. The usual
approach in the literature is to take either uniform weights or those based
on the distance between the jurisdictions. While we estimate our model
with uniform weights, our opinion is that the distance is not the main
factor influencing investment decisions and setting tax rates. Therefore,
in addition to uniform ωi j ’s, we also report results with four other kinds
of weights. The first one is based on the size of the country: the bigger
its GDP, the bigger is its role in the "rest-of-the-world" tax rate. The rest
three weights are based on FDI flows between the countries. Namely, we
assign bigger weights to the more open counties, i.e. those with higher
ratio of FDI flows to GDP. In the first case we take FDI flows for the last 3
years, in the second the average FDI flows for the period studied. Finally,
the last weights matrix is formed using the data on FDI inflows split by
geographical area. Having divided the world into seven regions, we assume
the role of country j in forming the tax rate in country i is bigger, the bigger
is the share of investments coming from i ’s region to country j (compared
to investments towards the rest of the world), and the bigger is the share of
investments from j ’s region to country i , compared to other regions. We
find this weight systemmost relevant to our estimation framework. At the
same time, we report the results with all the five weights.
Twomain econometric issuesmust be considered when estimating (10).
First, as all τi ’s at time t are jointly determined, their weighted sum will
clearly be endogenous and correlated with the error term. Indeed, it is easy
to see if we rewrite equation (10) in matrix form:
τ=βW τ+Xθ+², (11)
whereW is the matrix of weights andα is included in vector θ. It is possible
now to derive the equilibrium τ’s:
τ= (I −βW )−1Xθ+ (I −βW )−1², (12)
where I is the identity matrix. As it can be seen from equation (12), every
element of τ depends on all ²’s, which leads to endogeneity in (10), and
hence to inconsistent OLS estimates.
The second issue, which hinders us in estimating (10) directly, is that
the error terms in (10) may be spatially correlated, i.e. ² satisfies the rela-
tionship:
²= γM²+ξ, (13)
where γ is a certain vector and M is a certain matrix, depending on the
relationships between the error terms. Such correlationmay occur when
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the empirical model does not control for certain jurisdiction-specific char-
acteristics, which may in turn be spatially dependent. As a result, some of
²i ’s and ² j ’s may be correlated, which will drive us to a wrong conclusion
about the presence of strategic interaction, when there is no such. (Refer to
Brueckner (4) for detailed description of these issues.)
We follow Devereux et al. (8) in their method of solving these problems.
Namely, we use the instrumental variables approach. At the first stage we
regress τi ,t on Xi ,t , then use fitted values from the first-stage regression,
τˆi ,t , to calculate weighted averages for each country:
∑
j 6=i ωi j τˆi ,t . These
fitted values are asymptotically uncorrelated with the error term in (10),
therefore OLS will produce consistent estimates. So, at the second stage of
our estimation we run the regression (10), but with τˆ j ,t instead of τ j ,t in the
right-hand side. In addition, the very same method also helps to resolve
our second problem.
Another option is to useWX as instrument forW τ in the samemanner
as in the paragraph above. Substituting
∑
j 6=i ωi jτ j ,t with the fitted values
from the first-stage regression will also lead to asymptotically consistent
OLS estimates. With slight adjustments in specification, we use both meth-
ods in the paper. Although the directions of the estimates do not change,
the second method proved to produce more robust results than the first
one.
4.2 Data
We use a sample of 28 countries, years from 1996 to 2005. Countries in-
clude EU-15 (except Denmark and Luxembourg), Switzerland, Norway,
USA, Canada, Japan, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, 280
observations are included in the sample.
As a dependent variable we take the nowadays widely used effective
average tax rate (EATR). It is defined as a proportion of the pre-tax profit
from assets previously invested in the country, taken by the state as a tax
levy. EATR is calculated for a firm, which invests one unit, financed by
equity, debt or retained earnings, into plants or machinery with predefined
rate of profitability (usually 20% per period is considered). Then the profits
under no-taxation and existing taxation system in the country are com-
pared. EATR, generally, depends heavily on the statutory tax rate, and on
the definition of the taxable profit in each country, which is usually affected
by depreciation allowances. The EATR indicator is claimed to be the main
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measure of the tax burden formultinationals choosing the country to invest
in. This is definitely what we consider in our model, when firms invest in
the country with higher after-tax profit. Therefore we have chosen this
measure of the tax rate. At the same time, we also check the results when
statutory tax rates are used as a dependent variable. EATR’s for "old" OECD
(i.e. all except CEE) countries were calculated by Devereux and Griffith and
used in their paper (6). For the rest of the countries EATR’s were calculated
by Bellak et al. (2), Jacobs et al. (11), and Kotans (12). We use the ones
adjusted for country-specific inflation and interest rate. Statutory tax rates
are also adjusted for local income taxation.
While the choice of the tax burden measure is more or less obvious,
it is much more challenging to come up with an appropriate proxy of
governmental efficiency. The theoretical model solves this issue in a simple
way: the more efficient government produces more public goods out of the
same revenue. However, real life is more complicated and there are several
problems with implementing this measure in our estimation. First is that
governments producemore than one public good. Moreover, many of them
are hardly measurable in quantity (such as defense or law-making) and,
especially, quality. Secondly, even if we succeed inmeasuring these it will be
hard to come up with a unified indicator combining all factors and sorting
all countries in terms of their efficiency. Therefore, governmental efficiency
may bemore easily proxied by less direct indicators, both on the production
side (such as the level of corruption, which eventually influences the level
of public good production) and on the side of final outcomes (for instance,
some macroeconomic indicators of the country - the better they are the
more efficient is, apparently, the government). At the same time, using
such proxies makes the results of an estimation less robust.
As a main proxy for governmental efficiency we use the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom (IEF), issued yearly by the Heritage Foundation (10). IEF
provides a thorough examination of the factors, which contribute to the
economic freedom and prosperity. All of them are related to the activity of
the government. The index is the average of ten indicators: trade policy,
fiscal burden of the government, government intervention in the economy,
monetary policy, capital flows and foreign investment, banking and finance,
wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.
All these fields, apparently, are influenced by the governmental efficiency.
At the same time, economic freedom and efficiency are not necessarily
positively correlated. Such factors as government ownership in manufac-
turing and banking or trade liberalization can have an ambiguous effect on
22
The paper reflects the views of the author
the country, and in particular on its attractiveness for investors. Therefore,
we slightly adjust the index for our needs. Namely, we exclude the fiscal
burden, since it is already accounted for in the model, and in fact is a main
object for estimation. We experiment as well with the exclusion of other
factors from the final index, but these changes do not seem to affect the re-
sults significantly. As a result, we obtain the series varying from 1 – perfectly
free country to 5 – completely suppressed state. We also calculate relative
efficiency index (rel_IEF): for a certain year we divide every country’s index
by the average "rest-of-the-world" index, calculated for each year using the
same weights as for the tax rate.
In addition to IEF, we also test our model using other proxies for govern-
mental efficiency. In particular, we report the results when GDP per capita
(GDP_capita) is used instead. Indeed, the welfare of the population, char-
acterized quite closely by this indicator, should be a direct consequence
of governmental actions, including its policy towards attraction of invest-
ments. In addition to GDP per capita, we also control for Leviathan state
indicators, in particular the share of public employees compensation in
the country’s GDP (govt_compens). It can also be viewed as a proxy for
governmental efficiency.
In order to satisfy the assumptions of our theoretical model, as well
as in order to avoid endogeneity in our estimation we control for several
other factors. As a measure of the economy’s openness we use the amount
of foreign direct investments relative to GDP of the country (FDI/GDP).
In addition, we control for the size of the economy (GDP) and average
investment project’s profitability. As a proxy for this indicator we take
annual GDP growth (GDP_growth). As it was mentioned above, we also
include measure of Leviathan state (govt_compens) in each regression.
Finally, we add country dummies23 to the model’s specification in order to
capture country-specific effects.
Definitions, sources and certain statistical characteristics of the data
used in the estimation are presented in table 1.
4.3 Results
The results are presented in tables 2 and 3. Taking into account our "hard"
choice of proxies we report the received values for the five weights in two
different specifications: the first is when the proxy for governmental effi-
ciency is the Index of Economics Freedom, and the second is when we use
23Series xi such that xi (i )= 1 in each year, and xi ( j )= 0 for all other countries.
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Table 2: Estimation results: IEF as proxy*
Weights FDI_3y FDI_av GDP FDI_ ge-
ogr
uniform
av_tax_ fitted 2.85
(2.33)
2.82
(2.28)
0.74
(2.04)
1.01
(1.65)
1.09
(2.18)
IEF -0.05
(3.21)
-0.05
(3.28)
-0.05
(3.31)
-0.05
(3.13)
-0.05
(3.15)
GDP·10−7 5.7
(0.05)
1.3
(0.11)
23
(0.19)
5.5
(0.05)
-1.2
(0.01)
GDP_ growth 0.002
(1.29)
0.002
(1.37)
0.002
(1.47)
0.002
(1.45)
0.002
(1.30)
FDI/GDP·10−5 1.9
(1.49)
2.0
(1.54)
1.8
(1.40)
1.7
(1.26)
1.8
(1.40)
govt_ compens -0.64
(3.46)
-0.63
(3.33)
-0.63
(3.34)
-0.65
(3.37)
-0.69
(3.88)
R2 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 280
*: t-statistics (absolute values) are reported in the brackets. Values more than 1.9
indicate strong significance. Dependent Variable: EATR, proxy for governmental
efficiency: IEF, estimation method: least squares.
GDP per capita instead. We include country dummies in both cases, even
though the estimation without them brings relatively analogous results (at
least, signs of the coefficients studied do not change).
The estimation method used in both specifications is 2SLS with instru-
menting weighted average tax directly.24 At the same time, using IVs for
each country’s individual tax rate and then calculating weighted average
brings analogous results in most cases. The dependent variable used is
EATR adjusted for country-specific inflation and interest rates. Again, the
signs of the coefficients studied do not change inmost cases when statutory
tax rate is used instead.25
The results reported in the tables fit quite well our theoretical predic-
24Refer to section 4.1 for more details.
25The exact magnitudes and t-statistics with these specifications are not reported in the
paper. However, it is possible to obtain them directly from the author.
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Table 3: Estimation results: GDP per capita as proxy*
Weights FDI_3y FDI_av GDP FDI_ ge-
ogr
uniform
av_tax_ fitted 4.86
(3.11)
5.34
(3.16)
1.14
(2.36)
2.42
(2.45)
1.98
(3.04)
GDP_
capita·10−6
6.5
(2.95)
7.4
(3.12)
6.28
(2.55)
8.0
(2.71)
6.6
(2.93)
GDP·10−5 -1.4
(1.21)
-1.5
(1.23)
-1.2
(1.04)
-1.3
(1.08)
-1.5
(1.25)
GDP_ growth 0.002
(1.15)
0.002
(1.28)
0.002
(1.43)
0.002
(1.51)
0.002
(1.17)
FDI/GDP·10−6 -1.4
(0.10)
-1.3
(0.09)
-2.9
(0.20)
3.5
(0.24)
-2.6
(0.18)
govt_ compens -0.65
(3.49)
-0.61
(3.26)
-0.65
(3.39)
-0.60
(3.05)
-0.73
(4.06)
R-squared 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
N 280
*: t-statistics (absolute values) are reported in the brackets. Values more than 1.9
indicate strong significance. Dependent Variable: EATR, proxy for governmental
efficiency: GDP_capita, estimation method: least squares.
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tions. Indeed, the main prediction of our theoretical model was about the
influence of governmental efficiency on the tax rate setting. Using both
proxies (IEF and GDP per capita) produced results in line with the theory.
Namely, countries with higher predicted governmental efficiency, proxied
by the Index of Economic Freedom adjusted and GDP per capita, tend to
tax capital income heavier. The coefficient of IEF is negative in all 5 cases
and significantly different from zero. The p-value of it does not exceed
3% level regardless of weights, which is a very strong evidence in favour
of our predictions. The magnitude of the coefficient, −0.05, means that
0.1 decrease in the Index of Economic Freedom in some country (without
accounting a fiscal burden) – which is quite a reasonable improvement
for a 1-year period 26 – should lead to 0.5 percentage point increase of
the effective average tax rate (so that EATR rises from, say, 22% to 22.5%).
This is exactly what we predicted since IEF is by definition greater for the
governments which are less efficient, i.e. their average grade for different
policies is high.27
At the same time, the coefficient of GDP_capita (see table 3) is positive
with high significance. The p-values are somewhat larger than in the case
with IEF proxy, but still do not exceed the 3% level. This is also in line with
our expectations, since higher income of the population, as it was argued
in section 4.1, is usually the outcome of efficient actions of the government.
The magnitude of the coefficient is small in levels but quite significant
economically, since GDP_capita is measured in purchasing power parity
units in the sample, and the mean of it is a 5-digit number (20920 PPP
units). According to our estimations, an increase in annual population
income of 1000 PPP (purchasing power parity) units, which is in line with
observed GDP and population growths, will lead the EATR to increase by
about 0.7 percentage points. Therefore, the usage of both proxies support
our theoretical predictions.
An additional prediction of our model was that the tax rate in a country
should react in the same direction to the changes of taxation levels in other
countries. The results presented in tables 2 and 3, support this finding,
too. Indeed, the coefficient of the "rest-of-the-world" tax, which basically
estimates the slope of the governmental reaction function, is significantly
positive in all ten cases.28 The p-value ranges here from10% to less than 3%,
which is comparable with other empirical estimations of interjurisdictional
26Refer to the Table 2 for maximal, minimal and average magnitudes of IEF.
27See the discussion about our choice of proxies in section 4.1.
285 kinds of weights over two proxies for governmental efficiency.
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competition in the literature.29 The magnitude of the coefficient is quite
big compared to the results from other studies. However, it is comparable
with the results of similar estimation in tax competition.30 In addition, in
the most interesting cases of GDP and FDI_geogr weights the change in
the "rest-of-the-world" tax rate is forecasted to produce a change in the
country’s tax rate of almost the samemagnitude (the coefficient varies from
0.74 to 2.42 in different specifications). It means that if the world’s average
capital income tax rate (with different weights) increases by 1 percentage
point, the response of a government of a given country would also be to
increase EATR by about 1 percentage point, given there are no changes in
other controls.
It is worth noting again that the results presented are quite robust. First,
they are consistent through all 5 kinds of wages. Secondly, when another
specification is used the results do not change significantly. Namely, the
choice of dependent variable, choice of proxy for governmental efficiency,
method of IV estimation, and inclusion of country dummies are all con-
sidered. Therefore, we can conclude that a strong support of our theory is
found.
4.3.1 Testing the slope coefficient
One more prediction of our theoretical model concerns the slope of the
reaction function. We predict that the reaction function of a country be-
comes steeper with higher governmental efficiency. In this section we are
presenting our trials to estimate this theoretical finding on the same sample
of countries.
To be able to estimate the abovementioned property we have to modify
our model. The regression equation now looks the following way:
τi ,t =α+β
∑
j 6=i
ωi jτ j ,t +θ1rel_GEi ,t +γ(rel_GEi ,t −1) ·
∑
j 6=i
ωi jτ j ,t + (14)
+θXi ,t ,−1+²i ,t , i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk .
Here the notations of equation (10) are kept. In addition, rel_GEi ,t de-
notes the series of relative government efficiencies, i.e. normalized to the
weighted average of governmental efficiency for a certain year.
As it can be easily seen, wemodified equation (10) by adding the interac-
tion term between relative governmental efficiency and "rest-of-the-world"
29See Brueckner (4) for a survey.
30See, for example, Devereux (8).
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tax. With such specification the coefficient γ will be nothing more than
the magnitude of the governmental efficiency effect on the slope of the
reaction function. Note that it is important to compare each governmental
efficiency with the average one in the interaction term. That is why we
subtract one from rel_GEi ,t .
To be fully in line with our theoretical predictions we would demand β,
θ and γ to be positive, with γ sufficiently small in order not to overwhelm
the strategic interaction effect, expressed in the model by β.31 However,
these requirements may be substituted with weaker ones. Namely, the
following three properties should hold:
∂τi ,t
∂(av.tax)i ,t
=β+γ(rel_GEi ,t −1)> 0, (15)
∀rel_GEi ,t , i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk ,
∂τi ,t
∂rel_GEi ,t
= θ1+γ∗ (av.tax)i ,t > 0, (16)
∀(av.tax)i ,t , i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk ,
∂2τi ,t
∂rel_GEi ,t∂(av.tax)i ,t
= γ> 0, i = 1, . . . ,n, t1 ≤ t ≤ tk . (17)
Properties 15-17 hold if β, θ1 and γ are positive, and γ < β, but it is not
necessary condition.
Except for the interaction term the estimation procedure is similar to
the one described above in section 4.1. Again, we useWX , where X are
country-specific controls, as instrumental variables forW τ. The dependent
variable is again EATR adjusted for country-specific inflation and interest
rates, and IEF is used as a proxy for governmental efficiency. Additionally,
we control for the size of the economy (GDP), its openness (FDI/GDP),
expected profitability of an average project (GDP_growth), and Leviathan
state (govt_compens).
The results of the estimation are presented in table 4. As usual, we
report them using five kinds of weights.
It is easy to notice that the results presented in Table 4 are less robust,
with coefficients being less significant. Moreover, adding country dummies
to the regression makes the t-statistics even smaller. In addition, the coeffi-
cient of rel_IEF does not have the desirable sign. As IEF and governmental
31In fact, for extreme case, when rel_GE = 0, we would demand that γ< β. However, the
sample minimum in our case is 0.61, and we can somewhat relax this restriction. Refer to the
next paragraph.
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Table 4: Estimation results: slope coefficient*
Weights FDI_3y FDI_av GDP FDI_ ge-
ogr
uniform
av_tax_ fitted 2.45
(1.66)
2.26
(1.64)
1.00
(2.71)
1.28
(2.07)
0.89
(1.69)
rel_IEF 0.86
(0.85)
1.07
(1.15)
0.93
(3.20)
1.28
(2.77)
0.57
(1.28)
interaction -3.98
(0.90)
-4.84
(1.20)
-3.54
(3.36)
-5.07
(2.87)
-2.83
(1.39)
GDP·10−6 7.7
(3.13)
7.7
(3.10)
7.7
(3.08)
7.9
(3.13)
7.8
(3.20)
GDP_ growth -0.01
(6.10)
-0.01
(6.09)
-0.009
(6.42)
-0.009
(6.37)
-0.009
(6.27)
FDI/GDP·10−6 -2.9
(0.37)
-2.8
(0.36)
0.1
(0.01)
-1.8
(0.23)
-1.7
(0.22)
govt_ compens -0.33
(1.87)
-0.35
(1.98)
-0.48
(2.89)
-0.49
(2.85)
-0.37
(2.24)
R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25
N 280
*: t-statistics (absolute values) are reported in the brackets. Values more than 1.9
indicate strong significance. Dependent Variable: EATR, proxy for governmental
efficiency: rel_IEF, estimation method: least squares.
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efficiency are negatively correlated we would expect its coefficient to be
negative. However, these results are in line with our predictions at least
partly. Indeed, if we rewrite properties 15-17 for our concrete model we
obtain the conditions for the sample values:
rel_IEFi ,t < β−γ−γ , (18)
(av.tax)i ,t > −θ1
γ
, (19)
γ< 0. (20)
Note that γ in this case is smaller than zero. This fact is in line with our
predictions, since governmental efficiency and the Index of Economic
Freedom are negatively correlated by our assumption.
Looking at the distributions of rel_IEF and the weighted average of
tax rates we can calculate that in case of FDI_3y, not less than 97% records
in the sample satisfy all three properties. In case of the other weights the
figures are smaller, but still significant: 93% – FDI_av, 79% – GDP, 55% –
FDI_geogr, and 78% – uniform weights. Considering the fact that our proxy
for governmental efficiency is far from perfect, such figures provide quite
strong evidence in favor of our theoretical predictions.
5 Conclusions
This paper examines the effect of relative governmental efficiency on the
outcome of international tax competition game between countries. By
relative efficiency here wemean the fact that more efficient governments
can produce more units of public good out of one unit of private good. We
build a model with two countries, engaged in competition for foreign in-
vestments. Multinationals are assumed to be technologically dependent on
public good provision in the country, i.e. the more public good is provided
by the country the less it costs to produce there. Therefore, they make their
decision regarding the location of the investment based not only on the tax
rate they face, but also on the potential reduction in production costs due
to the availability of public goods.
Wefind that in equilibrium themore efficient country always sets higher
tax rate than the less efficient one. Moreover, the reaction functions of the
governments (i.e. the tax rate of a given country as a function of "rest-of-
the-world" tax rate) are found to be increasing, which is in line with the
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existing literature. Another finding is that the reaction function becomes
steeper with the increase in governmental efficiency.
The model is empirically tested on 28 countries, for the years 1996 to
2005. Wefind the "rest-of-the-world" average tax rate and the governmental
efficiency to affect significantly positively the tax rate in a certain country,
which supports the conclusions of the model. We also find quite a strong
evidence in favor of our predictions regarding the slope of the reaction
function.
What this means in practice is that the policy of tax harmonization
persistently targeted by OECD and EU, is not necessarily optimal for all
the countries in the region. On the one hand, highly efficient countries
should not be afraid of tax competition, since they have other instruments
to attract foreign firms. On the other hand, less efficient countries should
keep their taxes lower in order to induce investments.
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Appendix
Proposition 1 Let sˆi be the share of firms investing in the country i , i ∈
{A,B}, and sˆ be the technological attachment parameter of the firm, which is
indifferent between investing in either of countries. The following statements
are true:
1. If a+bτA ≥ 1+τB then ∀s > sˆ fs will invest in country A, and ∀s < sˆ
fs will invest in country B. Therefore, sˆB = sˆ and sˆA = 1− sˆ.
2. If, on the contrary, 1+τB ≥ a+bτA then∀s > sˆ fs will invest in country
B , and ∀s < sˆ fs will invest in country A. Therefore, sˆB = 1− sˆ and
sˆA = sˆ
Proof. Let us see, how sˆ(τA ,τB ) will look like. Firm s facing the tax rates
compares two following numbers: −τA+s ·ln(a+bτ) and−τB+s ·ln(1+τB ).
As earlier, we denote the share of firms going to B by sˆ. Define:
s˜ = τA −τB
ln(a+bτA)− ln(1+τB )
. (21)
Now let us consider the cases:
1. a+bτA ≥ 1+τB
In this case all fs , for which s ≤ s˜, invest in country B . To see this we
just have to solve the corresponding inequality:
−τA + s · ln(a+bτ)≤−τB + s · ln(1+τB );
s ≤ τA −τB
ln(a+bτA)− ln(1+τB )
= s˜, (22)
since we divide by a positive number. By definition of sˆi , sˆB = sˆ, sˆA =
1− sˆ.
The problemwith s˜ is that it is not always between 0 and 1. Therefore
we have to consider three subcases:
(a) τA ≤ τB ≤ a−1+bτA ⇒ s˜ ≤ 0. In this case all firms go to A and
sˆ = 0;
(b) s˜ ≥ 1 whenever (τA ,τB ) lies in the intersection of
{(τA ,τB ) : a+bτA ≥ 1+τB } and the set of solutions to the in-
equality:
τA −τB − ln(a+bτA)+ ln(1+τB )≥ 0. (23)
In this case all firms go to B and sˆ = 1.
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(c) Otherwise 0< s˜ < 1 and sˆ = s˜.
2. a+bτA ≤ 1+τB
This case is opposite to the previous one. Analogously, we have to
solve inequality (22). However, now the denominator is negative, so
the signs will change. Now fs will invest in country B whenever s ≥ s˜,
so by definition of sˆi , sˆB = sˆ, sˆA = 1− sˆ. But again, we have to consider
a few subcases:
(a) Both the nominator and the denominator in this case are nega-
tive, so s˜ can never be less than 0, hence sˆ is never 1;
(b) s˜ ≥ 1 when the solutions of the reverse of inequality (23):
−τA +τB + ln(a+bτA)− ln(1+τB )≥ 0 (24)
satisfy the condition a+bτA ≤ 1+τB . In this case sˆ = 0.
(c) Otherwise 0< s˜ < 1 and sˆ = 1− s˜.
Proposition 2 The response function of government A has the following
structure:
rA(τB )=
{
τB +² if τB < τ∗B ,
τB otherwise.
(25)
Proof. In the paper it was shown that government A will never set τA
lower than τB . Now we find the conditions, when the deviation from ”τB -
strategy”32 is optimal. Suppose, government A increases the tax from τB to
τB +², ²> 0. Firm s in this situation compares its potential profits in both
countries. If
−τB −²+ s · ln(a+b(τB +²))≥−τB + s · ln(1+τB ) (26)
then it stays in A. Otherwise fs moves to country B . Solving the inequality
further we obtain:
s > ²
ln(a+b(τB +²))− ln(1+τB ))
. (27)
Under the "τB -strategy" the revenue is τB . We have to check when the new
strategy gives more than τB . For that we solve the inequality:
(τB +²)(1− ²
ln(a+b(τB +²))− ln(1+τB ))
)> τB . (28)
32The strategy, when it is optimal to set τB
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Solving further we obtain:
²− (τB +²)²
ln(a+b(τB +²))− ln(1+τB ))
> 0 . (29)
Since ²> 0 by assumption, and ln(a+b(τB +²))> ln(1+τB ), as the ln(x) is
increasing function, we can simplify the inequality. Namely, we divide it by
² and find the common denominator. We get:
τB +²− ln(a+b(τB +²))+ ln(1+τB )< 0. (30)
Given that τB is sufficiently small, and a and b satisfy certain conditions,
inequality (30) always has solutions. We prove this fact in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Whenever a > b,33 there exists some threshold taxation level
τ∗B > 0 such that for any τB < τ∗B inequality (30) has solutions, and therefore
it is optimal for government A to deviate from "τB -strategy" and set higher
tax.
Proof.We have to prove that for any a and b, such that a > b, there exists
τ∗B > 0 that for any τB < τ∗B we can pick such ² > 0 that inequality (30) is
satisfied. Given τB , the left-hand side of inequality (30) is a function of ²:
fτB (²)= τB +²− ln(a+b(τB +²))+ ln(1+τB ) . (31)
Let us find the derivative of this function:
f ′τB = 1−
b
a+b(τB +²)
= a−b+b(τB +²)
a+b(τB +²)
> 0 ∀τB ≥ 0, ∀²> 0 . (32)
fτB is increasing and converging to infinity when ² goes to infinity, therefore
∀τB ≥ 0 ∃²∗ = ²∗(τB ) ∀²> ²∗ fτB (²)> 0 and ∀0< ²< ²∗ (if exists) fτB (²)> 0.
It means as well that fτB reaches its minimum at ²= 0 for any τB . Therefore,
if fτB (0)≥ 0 for some τB then there are no solutions to inequality (30). On
the contrary, if fτB (0)< 0 then for any ² ∈ (0,²∗) fτB (²)< 0, and government
A gets more revenue by deviating from the "τB -strategy" and by setting the
higher tax.
Now let us find τB ’s, for which the solution exist. Denote:
f (τB )= fτB (0)= τB − ln(a+bτB )+ ln(1+τB ) . (33)
33This condition can be relaxed to a > b − blnb. However, it complicates the proof sig-
nificantly, while bringing no additional insight in the model. Therefore, a proof with this
condition is omitted in the paper.
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f ′ = 1− b
a+bτB
+ 1
1+τB
> 0 . (34)
Therefore f is always increasing. Moreover,
f (0)=−lna < 0 ⇒ ∃τ∗B = τ∗B (a,b) f (τ∗B )= 0, and ∀τB > τ∗B f (τB )> 0 .
(35)
Now, if we take τB < τ∗B :
τB − ln(a+bτB )+ ln(1+τB )< 0 ⇒
⇒ fτB (0)< 0 ⇒ ∃²∗ = ²∗(τB ) such that fτB (²∗)= 0 (36)
and ∀²< ²∗ fτB (²)< 0 ,
what was needed to prove.
Proposition 4 Government B will never set higher tax than τA if it follows
optimal strategy.
Proof. Indeed, it is obvious that no firmwill go to B if τA ≤ τB ≤ a−1+bτA ,
since otherwise for any nonzero s fs will pay higher tax and receive less
public good. Let us check the case when τB > a−1+bτA .34 Obviously, in
this case country B may attract only the most public good indigent firms,
since it produces more public good, and at the same time charges much
higher tax. Therefore, if even themost "attached" firm in the set, f1, will not
be willing to invest in B , neither will other firmswith smaller s. f1 compares
its profits in both countries:
−τA + ln(a+bτA) vs. −a+1−bτA −²+ ln(a+bτA +²) , (37)
where τB = a−1+bτA +², ²> 0. Subtracting the right-hand side from the
left-hand side in (37) we obtain:
−τA + ln(a+bτA)+a−1+bτA +²− ln(a+bτA +²)=
= a+bτA +²− ln(a+bτA +²)−1−τA + ln(a+bτA) . (38)
The expression (38), as a function f of ² is increasing. Moreover:
f (0)= a+bτA −1−τA > 0. (39)
Therefore f1 gets more profits in country A nomatter how high is the tax,
and the level of public good provision, in country B . So do the rest of the
firms.
34Note that a−1+bτA > τA , since a > 1 and b ≥ 1 by assumption.
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